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Abstract
In this contribution to the 2002 Vaxjo conference on the foundations
of quantum mechanics and probability, I discuss three issues connected to
Bell’s theorem and Bell-CHSH-type experiments: time and the memory
loophole, finite statistics (how wide are the error bars, under local realism?),
and the question of whether a loophole-free experiment is feasible, a surpris-
ing omission on Bell’s list of four positions to hold in the light his results.
Le´vy’s (1935) theory of martingales, and Fisher’s (1935) theory of random-
ization in experimental design, take care of time and of finite statistics. I
exploit a (classical) computer network metaphor for local realism to argue
that Bell’s conclusions are independent of how one likes to interpret proba-
bility. I give a critique of some recent anti-Bellist literature.
1. Introduction
It has always amazed me that anyone could find fault with Bell (1964)).
Quantum mechanics cannot be cast into a classical mold. Well, isn’t that
delightful? Don’t Bohr, von Neumann, Feynman, all tell us this, each in their
own way? Why else are we fascinated by quantum mechanics? Moreover
Bell writes with such economy, originality, modesty, and last but not least,
humour.
I want to make it absolutely clear that I do not think that quantum me-
chanics is non-local. Bell also made it clear that his work did not prove that.
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In fact, in Bell (1981), the final section of the paper on Bertlmann’s famous
socks (chapter 16 of Bell (1987)), he gave a list of four quite different po-
sitions one could take, each one logically consistent with his mathematical
results. One of them is simply not to care: go with Bohr, don’t look for
anything behind the scenes, for if you do you will get stuck in meaningless
paradoxes, meaningless because there no necessity for anything behind the
scenes. If, however, like Bell himself, you have a personal preference for
imagining a realistic world behind the scenes, accept with Bell that it must
be non-local. You will be in excellent company: with Bohm-Riley, with
Girardi-Rimini-Weber (the continuous spontaneous localization model), and
no doubt with others. Alternatively, accept even worse consequences—on
which more, later.
However at Vaxjo the anti-Bellists seemed to form a vociferous major-
ity, though each anti-Bellist position seemed to me to be at odds with each
other one. All the same, I will in this paper outline a recent positive develop-
ment: namely, a strengthening of Bell’s inequality. This strengthening does
not strengthen Bell’s theorem—quantum mechanics is incompatible with lo-
cal realism—but it does strengthen experimental evidence for the ultimately
more interesting conclusion: laboratory reality is incompatible with local
realism.
You may have a completely different idea in your head from mine as to
what the phrases local realism and quantum mechanics stand for. As also
was made clear at Vaxjo, a million and one different interpretations exist for
each. Moreover these interpretations depend on interpretations of yet other
basic concepts such as probability. However let me describe my concrete
mathematical results first, and turn to the philosophy later. After that, I will
discuss some (manifestly or not) anti-Bellist positions, in particular those of
Accardi, Hess and Philipp, ’t Hooft, Khrennikov, Kracklauer, and Volovich.
I mentioned above that Bell (1981) lists four possible positions to hold,
each one logically consistent with his mathematical results. Naturally they
were not meant to be exhaustive and exclusive, but still I am surprised that
he missed a to my mind very interesting fifth possibility: namely, that any
experiment which quantum mechanics itself allows us to do, of necessity
contains a loophole, preventing one from drawing a watertight conclusion
against local realism. Always, because of quantum mechanics, it will be
possible to come up with a local-realistic explanation (but each time, a dif-
ferent one). This logical possibility has some support from Volovich’s re-
cent findings, and moreover makes ’t Hooft’s enterprise less hopeless than
the other four possibilities would suggest. (I understand that Ian Percival
has earlier promoted a similar point of view).
2
Personally, I do not have a preference for this position either, but put
it forward in order to urge the experimentalists to go ahead and prove me
wrong. It is a pity that the prevailing opinion, that the loophole issue is dead
since each different loophole has been closed in a different experiment, is
a powerful social disincentive against investing one’s career in doing the
definitive (loophole free) experiment.
2. A Computer Network Metaphor
To me, “local realism” is something which I can understand. And what I
can understand are computers (idealised, hence perfect, classical computers)
whose state at any moment is one definite state out of some extremely large
(albeit finite) number, and whose state changes according to definite rules at
discrete time points. Computers can be connected to one another and send
one another messages. Again, this happens at discrete time points and the
messages are large but discrete. Computers have memories and hard disks,
on which can be stored huge quantities of information. One can store data
and programs on computers. In fact what we call a program is just data for
another program (and that is just data for another program . . . but not ad
infinitum).
Computers can simulate randomness. Alternatively one can, in advance,
generate random numbers in any way one likes and store them on the hard
disk of one’s computer. With a large store of outcomes of fair coin tosses (or
whatever for you is the epitome of randomness) one can simulate outcomes
of any random variables or random processes with whatever probability dis-
tributions one likes, as accurately as one likes, as many of them as one likes,
as long as one’s computers (and storage facilities) are large and fast enough.
In the last section of the paper I will further discuss whether there is any
real difference between random number generation by tossing coins or by a
pseudo-random number generator on a computer.
Computers can be cloned. Conceptually, one can take a computer and set
next to it an identical copy, identical in the sense not only that the hardware
and architecture are the same but moreover that every bit of information in
every register, memory chip, hard disk, or whatever, is the same.
Computer connections can be cloned. Conceptually one can collect the
data coming through a network connection, and retransmit two identical
streams of the same data.
Consider a network of five computers connected linearly. I shall call
them A, X , O, Y and B. The rather plain “end” computers A and B are
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under my control, the more fancy “in between” computers X , O and Y are
under the control of an anti-Bellist friend called Luigi. My friend Luigi
has come up with a local realistic theory intended to show that Bell was
wrong, it is possible to violate the Bell inequalities in a local realistic way.
I have challenged my friend to implement his theory in some computer
programs, and to be specific I have stipulated that he should violate the
Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt (1969) version of the Bell inequalities,
as this version is the model for the famous Aspect, Dalibard, and Roger
(1982) experiment, and a host of recent experiments such as that of Weihs et al.
(1998). Moreover this experimental protocol was certified by Bell himself,
for instance in the “Bertlmann’s socks” chapter of “Speakable and Unspeak-
able”, as forming the definitive test of his theory.
Another of my anti-Bellist friends, Walter, has claimed that Bell ne-
glected the factor time in his theory. Real experiments are done in one lab-
oratory over a lengthy time period, and during this time period, variables at
different locations can vary in a strongly correlated way—the most obvious
example being real clocks! Well, in fact it is clear from “Bertlmann’s socks”
that Bell was thinking very much of time as being a factor in classical corre-
lation, see his discussion of the temporal relation between the daily number
of heart-attacks in Lyons and in Paris (the weather is similar, French TV is
identical, weekend or weekday is the same ...). In the course of time, the
state of physical systems can drift in a systematic and perhaps correlated
way. This means that the outcomes of consecutive measurements might be
correlated in time, probability distributions are not stationary, and statistical
tests of significance are invalidated. Information from the past is not for-
gotten, but accumulates. The phenomenon has been named “the memory
loophole”. More insidiously, in the course of time, information can propa-
gate from one physical subsystem to another, making everything even worse.
(Think of French TV, reporting events in both Paris and Lyons with a short
time lag.) In order to accomodate time I will allow Luigi to let his computers
communicate between themselves whatever they like, in between each sep-
arate measurement, and I will make no demands whatsover of stationarity
or independence. I do not demand that he simulates specific measurements
on a specific state. All I demand is that he violates a Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity. I suggest that he goes for the maximal 2
√
2 deviation corresponding
to a certain state and collection of measurement settings, but the choice is
up to him, since he has total control over his computers, and these choices
are out of my control. My computers are just going to supply the results of
independent fair coin tosses.
The experiment can only generate a finite amount of data. How are we
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going to decide whether the experiment has proved anything? How large
should N be and what is a criterion we can both agree to? A physicist
would say that we have a problem of finite statistics.
One of my pro-Bellist friends, Gregor, an experimental physicist, has
claimed that his experiment shows a thirty standard deviations departure
from local realism. As a statistician I am concerned that his calculation
of “thirty standard deviations” was done assuming Poisson statistics, which
comes down to assuming independence between succesive measurements,
while the anti-Bellist, because of the memory loophole, need not buy this as-
sumption, hence need not buy the conclusion. As a statistician I realise that I
must do my probability calculation from the point of view of the local realist
(even if in my opinion this point of view is wrong). I must show that, as-
suming a local realist position, the probability of such an extreme deviation
as is actually observed is very small. This is not the same as showing that,
assuming quantum mechanics is true, the probability that my experiment
would have given the “wrong” conclusion (i.e., a conclusion favourable to
the local realist) is very small. Of course it is a comfort to know this in
advance of doing the experiment, and retrospectively it confirms the experi-
menter’s skill, but to the local realist it is just irrelevant.
Now here an interesting paradox appears: a local realist theory is typi-
cally a deterministic theory, hence does not allow one to make probability as-
sumptions at all. However I think that even local realists agree that there are
situations where one can meaningfully talk probability, even if any person’s
stated interpretation of the word might appear totally different from mine.
However he interprets the word probability, most local realists will agree
that in a well equipped laboratory we could manufacture something pretty
close to an idealised fair coin (by which I mean a coin together with a well-
designed coin tossing apparatus). It could be close enough, for instance, that
we would both be almost certain that in 40 000 tosses the number of heads
will not exceed 20 000 by more than 1 000 (10 standard deviations). Be-
hind this lies a combinatorial fact: the number of binary sequences of length
40 000, in which the number of 1’s exceeds 20 000 by more that 1 000, is
less than a fraction exp(−12102) of the total number of sequences.
So I hope my anti-Bellist friends will let me (the person in control of
computers A and B) either, ahead of the experiment, store the outcomes of
fair coin tosses in them, or simulate them with a good pseudo-random num-
ber generator, and more importantly, will be convinced when I give proba-
bility statements concerning this and only this source of randomness in our
computer experiment.
Now here are the rules of our game. We are going to simulate an ide-
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alised, perfect (no classical loopholes) Bell-CHSH type delayed choice ex-
periment. For the sake of argument let us fix N = 15000 as the total num-
ber of trials (pairs of events, photon pairs, . . . ). In advance, Luigi has set up
his three computers with any programs or data whatsoever stored on them.
He is allowed to program his chameleon effect, or Walter’s B-splines and
hidden-variables-which-are-not-actually-elements-of-reality, or Al’s theory
of QEM, whatever he likes.
For n = 1, . . . , N = 15000, consecutively, the following happens:
1. Computer O, which we call the source, sends information to comput-
ers X and Y , the measurement stations. It can be anything. It can be
random (previously stored outcomes of actual random experiments) or
pseudo-random or deterministic. It can depend in an arbitrary way on
the results of past trials (see item 5). Without loss of generality it can
be considered to be the same—send to each computer, both its own
message and the message for the other.
2. Computers A and B, which we call the randomizers, each send a measurement-
setting-label, namely a 1 or a 2, to computers X and Y . Actually,
I will generate the labels to simulate independent fair coin tosses (I
might even use the outcomes of real fair coin tosses, done secretly in
advance and saved on my computers’ hard disks).
3. Computers X and Y each output an outcome ±1, computed in what-
ever way Luigi likes from the available information at each measure-
ment station. He has all the possibilities mentioned under item 1.
What each of these two computers do not have, is the measurement-
setting-label which was delivered to the other. Denote the outcomes
x(n) and y(n).
4. Computers A and B each output the measurement-setting-label which
they had previously sent to X and Y . Denote these labels a(n) and
b(n). An independent referee will confirm that these are identical to
the labels given to Luigi in item 2.
5. Computers X , O and Y may communicate with one another in any
way they like. In particular, all past setting labels are available at all
locations. As far as I am concerned, Luigi may even alter the computer
programs or memories of his machines.
At the close of these N = 15000 trials we have collected N quadru-
ples (a(n), b(n), x(n), y(n)), where the measurement-setting-labels take the
values 1 and 2, the measurement outcomes take the values ±1. We count the
the number of times the two outcomes were equal to one another, and the
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number of times they were unequal, separately for each of the four possible
combinations of measurement-setting-labels:
N=ab = #{n : x(n) = y(n), (a(n), b(n)) = (a, b)},
N 6=ab = #{n : x(n) 6=y(n), (a(n), b(n)) = (a, b)},
Nab = #{n : (a(n), b(n)) = (a, b)}.
From these counts we compute four empirical correlations (a mathematical
statistician would call them raw, or uncentred, product moments), as follows.
ρ̂ab =
N=ab −N 6=ab
Nab
.
Finally we compute the CHSH contrast
Ŝ = ρ̂12 − ρ̂11 − ρ̂21 − ρ̂22.
Luigi’s aim is that this number is close to 2
√
2, or at least, much larger than
2. My claim is that it cannot be much larger than 2; in fact, I would not
expect a deviation larger than several times 1/
√
N above 2. Weihs et al.
(1998) obtained a value of Ŝ ≈ 2.73 also with N ≈ 15 000 in an experiment
with a similar layout, except that the measurement stations were polariz-
ing beam-splitters measuring pairs of entangled photons transmitted from a
source through 200m of glass fibre each, and the randomizers were quantum
optical devices simulating (close to) fair coin tosses by polarization mea-
surements of completely unpolarized photons, see Appendix 1. A standard
statistical computation showed that the value of Ŝ they found is 30 standard
deviations larger than 2.
Please note that Luigi’s aim is certainly achievable from a logical point
of view. It is conceivable, even, that N 6=12 = 0 and N=11 = N=21 = N=22 = 0,
hence that ρ̂12 = +1, ρ̂11 = ρ̂21 = ρ̂22 = −1, and hence that Ŝ = 4. In
fact if Luigi would generate his outcomes just as I generated the settings, as
independent fair coin tosses, this very extreme result does have a positive
probability. The reader might like to compute the chance.
In order to be able to make a clean probability statement, I would like to
make some harmless modifications to Ŝ. First of all, note that the “correla-
tion” between binary (±1 valued) random variables is twice the probability
that they are equal, minus 1:
ρ̂ab =
N=ab − (Nab −N=ab)
Nab
= 2
N=ab
Nab
− 1.
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Define
p̂=ab = N
=
ab/Nab.
Luigi’s aim is to have
(Ŝ − 2)/2 = p̂=12 − p̂=11 − p̂=21 − p̂=22
close to
√
2 − 1, my claim is that it won’t be much larger than 0. Now
multiply (Ŝ − 2)/2 by N/4 and note that the four denominators Nab in the
formulas for the p̂=ab will all be pretty close to the same value, N/4. I propose
to focus on the quantity Z ≈ N(Ŝ − 2)/8 obtained by cancelling the four
denominators against N/4:
Z = N=12 −N=11 −N=21 −N=22.
Luigi’s aim is to have this quantity close to N(
√
2 − 1)/4 ≈ N/10, or at
least, significantly larger than 0, while I do not expect it to be larger than 0
by several multiples of
√
N .
He will not succeed. It is a theorem that whatever Luigi’s programs
and stored data, and whatever communication between them at intermediate
steps,
Pr
{
Z ≥ k
√
N
}
≤ exp
(
−12k2
)
,
where k ≥ 0 is arbitrary. For instance, with N = 15000, and k = 12.25,
one finds that k
√
N ≈ N/10 while exp(−1212.252) ≤ 10−32.
In fact I can improve this result—as if improvement were necessary!—
replacing k in the right hand side by a number one and three quarters times
as large, by a technique called random time change, which I shall explain
later. But I cannot get any further improvement, in particular, I cannot reach
exp(−12302), corresponding to Weihs et al.’s (1998) thirty standard devia-
tions. Why? Because their calculation (with N ≈ 15 000) was done assum-
ing independent and identically distributed trials, and assuming probabilities
equal to the observed relative frequencies, very close to those predicted by
quantum mechanics; whereas my calculation is done assuming local real-
ism, under the most favourable conditions possible under local realism, and
assuming no further randomness than the independent fair coin tosses of the
randomizers.
If you are unhappy about my move from correlations to counts, let me
just say that I can make similar statements about the original Ŝ, by com-
bining the probability inequality for Z with similar but easier probability
inequalities for the Nab.
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3. Martingales
Let me give a sketch of the proof. I capitalize the symbols for the settings
and outcomes because I am thinking of them as random variables. Write
each of the counts in the expression for Z as a sum over the N trials of an
indicator variable (a zero/one valued random variable) indicating whether or
not the event to be counted occured on the nth trial. A difference of sums is
a sum of differences. Consequently, if we define
∆
(n)
ab = 1{X(n) = Y (n), (A(n), B(n)) = (a, b)},
∆(n) = ∆
(n)
12 −∆(n)11 −∆(n)21 −∆(n)22 ,
Z(n) =
n∑
m=1
∆(m),
then Z = Z(N). Now I will show in a moment, using a variant of Bell’s 1964
argument, that for each n, conditional on the past history of the first n − 1
trials, the expected value of ∆(n) does not exceed 0, whatever that history
might be. Moreover, ∆(n) can only take on the values −1, 0 and 1, in partic-
ular, its maximum minus its minimum possible value (its range) is less than
or equal to 2. This makes the stochastic process Z(0), Z(1), . . . , Z(n), . . . , Z(N)
a supermartingale with increments in a bounded range, and with initial
value Z(0) = 0. The definition of a supermartingale is precisely the property
that the increments ∆(n) have nonpositive conditional expectation given the
past, for each n. A supermartingale is a generalisation of a random walk with
zero or negative drift. Think for instance of the amount of money in your
pocket as you play successive turns at a roulette table, where the roulette
wheel is perfect, but the presence of a 0 and 00 means that on average,
whatever amount you stake, and whatever you bet on, you lose 1/19 of your
stake at each turn. You may be using some complex or even randomized
strategy whereby the amount of your stake, and what you bet on (a specific
number, or red versus black, or whatever) depends on your past experience
and on auxiliary random inputs but still you lose on average, conditional on
the past at each time point, whatever the past. The capital of the bank is
a submartingale—nonnegative drift. If there would be no 0 and 00, both
capitals would be martingales—zero drift. In a real roulette game there will
be a maximum stake and hence a maximum payoff. Your capital changes by
an amount between the maximal payoff and minus the maximal stake. Thus
your capital while playing roulette develops in time as a supermartingale
with increments of bounded range (maximal payoff plus maximal stake). If
you cannot play more than N turns, with whatever strategy you like (includ-
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ing stopping early), it can only very rarely happen that your capital increases
by more than a few times
√
N times half the range, as we shall now see.
According to Hoeffding’s 1963 inequality, if a supermartingale (Z(n) :
n = 0, 1, . . . , N) is zero at time n = 0, and the range of its increments is
bounded by 2, then
Pr
{
max
n≤N
Z(n) ≥ k
√
N
}
≤ exp
(
−12k2
)
.
Note that if the increments of the supermartingale were actually independent
and identically distributed, with range bounded by 2, then the maximum
variance of Z(N) is precisely equal to N , achieved when the increments are
equal to ±1 with equal probability 12 . The Chebyshev inequality (sometimes
known as Markov inequality) would then tell us that Z(N) exceeds k√N
with probability smaller than 1/k2. Hoeffding has improved this in two
ways: an exponentially instead of geometrically decreasing probability, and
a maximal inequality instead of a pointwise inequality. One cannot do much
better than this inequality: in the most favourable case, just described, for
large N we would have that Z(N) is approximately normally distributed
with variance N , and the probability of large deviations of a normal variate
behaves up to a constant and a lower order (logarithmic) term precisely like
exp(−12k2).
The proof of Hoeffding’s inequality can be found in the better elemen-
tary probability textbooks and uses Markov’s inequality, together with a ran-
dom time change argument, and finally some elementary calculus. This
gives a clue to how I can improve the result: consider the random process
only at the times when ∆(n) 6= 0. In other words, thin out the time points
n = 0, 1, ... in a random way, only look at the process at the time points
which are left. By Doob’s optional stopping theorem it is still a supermartin-
gale when only looked at intermittently, even when we only look at random
time points, provided that we never need to look ahead to select these time
points. The increments of the thinned process still have a range bounded by
2. Hence Hoeffding’s inequality still applies. However, time is now running
faster, thus the value of N in the inequality as stated for the new process cor-
responds to cN in the old, with c > 1. In fact, in the actual experiment we
only see a ±1 in a fraction 0.325 = 14
∑
a,b p
=
a,b of all trials, hence we can
improve the k on the right hand side by a factor 1/
√
0.325 = 1.75, hence
12.25 can be increased to 21.5.
It remains to prove the supermartingale property. Consider the quantity
∆(n). Condition on everything which happened in the first n− 1 trials, and
also on whatever new information Luigi placed on his computers between
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the n− 1st and nth trial. Consider the situation just after Luigi’s computers
X and Y have received their information from O, just before they receive
the settings from A and B. Under my conditioning, the state of Luigi’s com-
puters is fixed (non random). Clone Luigi’s computers (this is only a thought
experiment). Give the first copy of computer X the input 1, as if this value
came from A, and give the second copy the input 2; do the same in the other
wing of the experiment. Let’s drop the upper index (n), and denote by x1
and x2 the outputs of the two clones of X , denote by y1 and y2 the outputs
of the two clones of Y . Because we are conditioning on the past up till the
generation of the settings in the nth trial, everything is deterministic except
the two random setting labels, denoted by A and B. The actual output from
the actual (uncloned) computer X is X = xA, similarly in the other wing of
the experiment. We find
∆
(n)
ab = 1{X = Y, (A,B) = (a, b)}
= 1{xa = yb}1{(A,B) = (a, b)}.
The (conditional) expectation of this quantity is 1{xa = yb}/4, since the
randomizers still produce independent fair coin tosses given the past, and
given whatever further modifications Luigi has made. Hence the expectation
of ∆(n) given the past up to the start of the nth trial equals one quarter times
1{x1 = y2} − 1{x1 = y1} − 1{x2 = y1}− 1{x2 = y2}. Now since the xa
and yb only take the values ±1, it follows that (x1y2)(x1y1)(x2y1)(x2y2) =
+1. The value of a product of two±1 valued variables encodes their equality
or inequality. We see that the number of equalities within the four pairs
involved is even. It is not difficult to see that it follows from this, that the
value of 1{x1 = y2} − 1{x1 = y1} − 1{x2 = y1} − 1{x2 = y2} can
only be 0 or −2, so is always less than or equal to 0. We have proved the
required property of the conditional expectation of ∆(n) conditioning not
only on the past n − 1 trials but also on what happens between n − 1st and
nth trial. Average over all possible inter-trial happenings, to obtain the result
we want. The theorem is proved.
As I remarked before, computers X , O and Y are allowed to commu-
nicate in anyway they like between trials, and Luigi is even allowed to in-
tervene between trials, changing their programs or data as he likes, even
in a random way if he likes. He can make use in all his computers of the
outcomes of the randomizers at all previous trials. It does not help. No as-
sumption has been made of any kind of long run stability of the outcomes
of his computers, or stationarity of probability distributions. The only re-
quirement has been on my side, that I am allowed to choose setting labels at
random, again and again. Only this randomness drives my conclusion. You
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may see my theorem as a combinatorial statement, referring to the fraction
of results obtained under all the 4N different combinations of values of all
a(n) and b(n).
Further details are given in Gill (2003) though there I used the Bernstein
rather than the Hoeffding inequality; Hoeffding turned out to give sharper
results. A publication is in preparation giving more mathematical details and
further results. In particular one can give similar Hoeffding bounds for the
original quantity of interest Ŝ, and the unbiasedness of the two randomizers
is not crucial. In fact Weihs had probabilities of heads equal to 0.48 and to
0.42 in the two wings of his experiment.
Martingales (avant la lettre) were introduced into probability theory by
the great French probabilist Paul Le´vy in 1935. The name martingale was
given to them a few years later by his student Ville, who used them to ef-
fectively destroy Richard von Mises’ programme to found probability on the
notion of collectives and limiting relative frequencies. Only Andrei Nikolae-
vich Kolmogorov realized that this conclusion was false, and he went on to
develop the notion of computational complexity based on von Mises’ ideas.
Later still, the Dutch mathematician Michiel van Lambalgen has shown that
a totally rigorous mathematical theory of collectives can be derived if one re-
places the axiom of choice (which makes mathematical existence theorems
easy, a double edged sword since it creates pathologies as well as desired
results) with an alternative axiom, closer to physical intuition.
The year 1935 also saw the introduction, by the great British statistician
Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher, of the notion of randomization into experimental
design. He showed that randomized designs gave an experimenter total con-
trol of uncontrollable factors which could otherwise prevent any conclusions
being drawn from an experiment.
4. Metaphysics
The interpretation of Bell’s theorem depends on notions of what is quantum
mechanics, what is local realism, and behind them, what is probability. By
the way, Bell himself does not state a theorem; just shows that certain as-
sumptions imply a certain inequality. He shows that under a conventional in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics, this inequality could be violated. How-
ever, it has become conventional to call the statement that quantum me-
chanics and local realism are incompatible with one another, Bell’s theorem.
This is a very convenient label, all the more convenient since later authors
have obtained the same conclusion through consideration of other predic-
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tions of quantum mechanics, some of them not on the face of it involving an
inequality as Bell’s. Actually, Dam, Gill, and Gru¨nwald (2003) argue else-
where that these proofs of Bell’s theorem without inequalities (Hardy, 1993),
or even without probability (Greenberger, Horne, and A., 1989), do actually
involve hidden probability inequalities.
On the one hand, Bell’s theorem depends on an interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, together with an assumption that certain states and measure-
ments, which one can consider as allowed by the mathematical framework,
can also arise “in Nature”, including Nature as manipulated by an experi-
menter in a laboratory. What I call Bell’s missing fifth position, is the po-
sition that quantum mechanics itself forbids these states ever to exist. And
not just the specific states and measurements corresponding to a particular
proof of Bell’s theorem, but any which one could use in the proof. Restrict-
ing attention to a Bell-CHSH type experimental set-up, one does not need to
achieve the magic 2
√
2, one only needs to significantly exceed the bound 2.
However, let me briefly describe the calculations behind this magic number
(an upper bound under quantum mechanics, according to the Cirel’son in-
equality), since this leads naturally to a discussion of the role of probability.
It is conventional and reasonable to take the Hilbert space corresponding
to a physical system consisting of two well separated parts of space as being
the tensor product of spaces corresponding to the two parts separately. To
achieve 2
√
2, we need that a state exists (can be made to exist) of the joint
system, which can be written (approximately) in the form |00〉+ |11〉 (up to
normalization, and up to a tensor product with whatever else you like, pure
or mixed); where as usual |00〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |11〉 = |1〉 ⊗ |1〉, and |0〉 and 1〉
stand for two orthonormal vectors in both the first and the second space. We
need that one can simultaneously (to a good enough approximation) measure
whether the first subsystem is in the state cosα|0〉 + sinα|1〉 or in the state
orthogonal to this, sinα|0〉−cosα|1〉; and whether the second is in the state
cos β|0〉+sin β|1〉 or in sin β|0〉−cos β|1〉; where one may choose between
α = α1 or α = α2, and between β = β1 and β = β2; and where a good
choice of angles (settings) leading to the famous 2√2 are α1 = −pi/4−pi/8,
α2 = −pi/8, β1 = 0, β2 = pi/4.
Conventionally it is agreed that the probability to find subsystem one in
state |α〉 = cosα|0〉+sinα|1〉 and subsystem two in state |β〉 = cos β|0〉+
sinβ|1〉, when prepared in Ψ = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, is the squared length of
the inner product of Ψ with |α〉⊗|β〉, which turns out to equal 12 cos2(α−β).
This is the probability of the outcome +1,+1. The probability of −1,−1
turns out to be the same, while that of +1,−1 and of −1,+1 are both equal
to 12 sin
2(α− β)/2. The marginal probabilities of ±1 now turn out to equal
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2 and the probability of equal outcomes is cos
2(α − β). Under the choices
of angles above, one obtains p=12 = (1+1/
√
2)/2 ≈ 0.85, while all the other
p=ab = (1−1/
√
2)/2 ≈ 0.15. Consequently p=12−p=11−p=21−p=22 = (
√
2−1).
Out of these calculations came joint probabilities of outcomes of binary
measurements and every word here needs to be taken literally, if the ar-
gument is to proceed: there are measurements taken in both wings of the
experiment, and each can only result in a ±1. We use quantum mechanics
to tell us what the probability of various combinations of outcomes is. Now
there are a great many ways to try to make sense of the notion of probability,
but everyone who uses the word in the context of quantum mechanics would
agree that if one repeatedly measures a quantum system in the same state, in
the same way, then relative frequencies of the various possible outcomes will
stabilize in the long run, and they will stabilize to the probabilities, whatever
that word may mean, computed by quantum mechanics. In the quantum ver-
sion of our experiment, Z/N will stabilize to the value (
√
2− 1)/4.
My mathematical derivation of a stronger (probabilistic) version of the
Bell inequalities did not hinge on any particular interpretation of probability.
Someone who uses the word probability has a notion of fair coin tosses, and
will not hesitate to apply probability theory to experiments involving nothing
else than two times 15 000 fair coin tosses. If a certain event specified before
the coins are tossed has a probability smaller than 10−32 one is not going to
see that event happen (even though logically it might happen).
It seems to me that the interpretation of probability does not play any se-
rious role in the ongoing controversy concerning Bell’s theorem. What does
play a role is that quantum mechanics is used to compute joint probabilities
of outcomes of binary measurements.
Many quantum physicists will object that real physicists do not use quan-
tum mechanics to compute probabilities, only the certain values of averages
pertaining to huge collectives. Many others avoid recourse to Born’s law by
extending the quantum mechanical treatment to as large a part of the mea-
surement device as possible. If probability is involved it appears to come in
through an uncontroversial backdoor as statistical variation in the medium
or the elements of the collective.
That may be the situation in many fields, but people in those fields do
not then test Bell’s theorem. The critical experiment involves binary out-
comes and binary settings, committed to sequentially as I have outlined. A
better objection is that in no experiment done to date, has the experimental
protocal described in my computer metaphor been literally enforced. For
instance, in Weihs et al.’s (1998) experiment, the only one to date where the
randomization of detector settings at a sufficiently fast rate was taken seri-
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ously (Aspect did his best but could only implement a poor surrogate), the
N = 15000 events were post-selected from an enormously much larger col-
lection of small time intervals in most of which there was no detection event
at all in either wing of the experiment; in a small proportion there was one
detection event in one wing of the experiment or the other but not both; and
in a smaller proportion still, there was a detection event in both wings of the
experiment. Bell’s argument just does not work when the binary outcomes
are derived from a post-experimental conditioning (post-selection) on val-
ues of other variables. Other experiments free of this loophole, did not (and
could not) implement the delayed random choice of settings; for instance
Rowe et al.’s (2001) experiments with trapped ions.
Bell was well aware of this problem. In “Bertlman’s socks” he offers a
resolution, whereby the sourceO may output at random time moments a sig-
nal that something is about to happen. Measurements at X and Y based on
a stream of random settings from A and B take place continuously, but after
the experiment has run for some time, one selects just those measurements
within an appropriate time interval after a saved “alert” message from O. It
is practically extremely important that this selection may be done after the
experiment has run its course. Post-selection is bad, but post-pre-selection
is fine.
By the way, the martingale methods I outlined above are admirably
suited to adaptation and extension to continuous time measurement (of dis-
crete events). Under reasonable (but of course untestable) “unbiased detec-
tion” assumptions, one can obtain the same kind of inequalities, but now
allowing detection events at random time points, and a random total number
of events.
But is “local realism” adequately represented by my metaphor of a com-
puter network? For Bell, the key property of the crucial experiment is that
the measurement station X commits itself to a specific (binary) outcome,
shortly after receiving a (binary) input from randomizer A, before a signal
from the other wing of the experiment could have arrived with information
concerning the input which randomizer B generated in the other wing of the
experiment. In the short time period between input of a and output of x,
as far as the physical mechanism leading to the result x is concerned, we
need only consider a bounded region of space which completely excludes
the physical systems B and Y . For me, “local realism” should certainly
imply that a sufficiently detailed (microscopic) specification of the state in
some bounded region of space would (mostly) fix the outcomes of macro-
scopic, discrete (for instance, binary) variables. For instance, a sufficiently
detailed specification of the initial state of a coin-tossing apparatus would
15
(mostly) fix the outcome. This does not prevent the outcome from being
apparently random, on the contrary, but it does “explain” the apparent ran-
domness through the variation of the initial conditions when the experiment
is repeated.
This means that in a thought experiment one can clone the relevant as-
pects of the relevant portion of physical space, and one can carry out the
thought experiment: feed into the same physical system both of the possi-
ble inputs from the randomizer and thereby fix both the possible outputs.
The output you actually see is what you would have seen if you would have
chosen, the input which you actually chose.
Bell (1964, 1987) used a statistical conditional independence assump-
tion, together with an assumption that conditional probability distributions
of outcomes in one wing of the experiment do not depend on settings in the
other wing, rather than my “counterfactual definite” characterization of lo-
cal realism. Actually it is a mathematical theorem that the two mathematical
notions are equivalent to one another. Each implies the other. Note that I
do not require that my counterfactual or hidden variables physically exist,
whatever that might mean, but only that they can be mathematically intro-
duced in such a way that the mathematical model with “counterfactuals”
reproduces the joint probability distribution of the manifest variables.
In my opinion the present unfashionableness of counterfactual reasoning
in the philosophy of science is quite misguided. We would not have ethics,
justice, or science, without it.
The original EPR argument also gives support for these counterfactuals:
we know that if one measures with the same settings in the two wings of
the experiment, one would obtain the same outcomes. Hence a local realist
(like Einstein) quite reasonably considers the outcome which one would find
under a given setting in one wing of the experiment, as deterministically
encoded in the physical state of that part of the physical system, just before
it is measured, independently of how it is actually measured.
In my opinion the stylized computer network metaphor for a good Bell-
CHSH type experiment is precisely what Bell himself was getting at. One
cannot attack Bell on the grounds that this experiment has never been done
yet. One might attack him on the grounds that it never can be done. One
will need good reasons for this. His argument does not require photons, nor
this particular state and these particular measurements. Again, showing that
a particular experimental set-up using a particular kind of physical system is
unfeasible, does not show that all experimental set-ups are unfeasible.
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5. A Miscellany of Anti-Bellist Views
Bell’s Four Positions
Bell offered four quite different positions which one might like to take com-
patible with his mathematical results. They were:
1. Quantum mechanics is wrong.
2. Predetermination.
3. Nature is non-local.
4. Don’t care (Bohr) .
In my opinion he missed an intriging fifth position:
5. A decisive experiment cannot be done.
I would like to discuss a number of recent works in the light of these possi-
bilities and the results I have described above.
Accardi and the Chameleon Effect
In numerous works L. Accardi claims that Bell’s arguments are fundamen-
tally flawed, because Bell could only think of randomness in a classical way:
pulling coloured balls out of urns, where the colour you get to see was the
colour which was already painted on the ball you happended to pick. If
however you select a chameleon out of a cage, where some chameleons are
mutant, and you place the chameleon on a leaf, it might turn green, or it
might turn brown, but it certainly did not have that colour in advance.
This is certainly a colourful metaphor but I do not think that chameleons
are that different from coloured billiard balls: according to Accardi’s own
story whether or not a chameleon is mutant is determined by its genes, which
certainly did not get changed by picking up one chameleon or another; and
a mutant chameleon always turns brown when placed on a green leaf.
The metaphor is also supposed to carry the idea that the measurement
outcome is not a preexisting property of the object, but is a result of an evo-
lution of measurement apparatus and measured object together. It seems to
me that this is precisely Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation: one cannot see
measurement outcomes separate from the total physical context in which
they appear. Bohr’s answer to EPR was to apply this idea also rigorously
even when two parts of the measurement apparatus and two parts of the
object being measured are light-years apart. This philosophy certainly abol-
ishes the EPR paradox but to my mind hardly explains it.
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Accardi does provide some mathematics (of the quantum probability
kind) which is supposed to provide a local realistic model of the EPR phe-
nomenon. Naturally a good quantum theoretician is able to replace the von
Neumann measurement of one photon by a Schro¨dinger evolution of a pho-
ton in interaction with a measurement device in such a way that though
particle and apparatus together are still in a pure state at the end of the evo-
lution, the reduced state of the measurement apparatus is a mixed state over
two macroscopically distinct possibilities. One can do this for the two par-
ticles simultaneously and arrive at a mathematical model which reproduces
the EPR correlations in a local way, in a sense that the various items in the
model can be ascribed to separate parts of reality. I don’t think it qualifies
as a local realistic model.
However Accardi believes it is a local realistic model in the sense that he
could have computer programs running on a network of computers which
would simulate the EPR correlations, while implementing his mathemati-
cal theory. These computer programs have run through several versions but
presently Accardi’s web site does not seem to be accessible. Unfortunately
none of the versions I have been able to test allowed me the sort of control
over the protocol of the experiment, to which I am entitled under. In particu-
lar, I was not able to see the raw data, only correlations. However by setting
N = 1 one can get some idea what is going on inside the blackbox. Sur-
prisingly with N = 1 it was possible to observe a correlation of ±1.4. Has
the chameleon multiplied the outcome ±1 in one wing of the experiment by√
2? A later version of the program also allowed the outcome “no detec-
tion” and though the author still claims categorically that Bell was wrong,
the main thrust of the paper seems now to be to model actual experiments,
which as is abundantly known suffer seriously from the detection loophole.
The martingale results which I have outlined above were derived in or-
der to determine how large N should be, so that I would have no danger of
losing a public bet with Accardi, that his computer programs could not vi-
olate the Bell-CHSH inequalities in an Aspect-type experiment, which is to
say an experiment with repeated random choice of settings. Since he was to
be totally free in what he put on his computers I could not use standard sta-
tistical methods to determine a safe sample size. Fortunately the martingale
came to my rescue.
Hess and Philipp and non-elements-of-reality
I first became aware of the contributions of Hess and Philipp through an
article in the science supplement of a reliable Dutch newspaper. Einstein
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was right after all. It intrigued me to discover that there was a fatal time-
loophole in Bell’s theorem, when I had just succeeded in fixing this loophole
myself in order to make a safe bet with Accardi.
The first publications by these authors appeared in print in somewhat
mangled form, since the journal had requested that the paper be reduced and
cut in two pieces. Some notational confusions and mismatches made it very
difficult to follow the arguments. On the one hand the papers contained a
long verbal critique of Bell, on the lines that correlations at a distance can
easily be caused by synchronous systematic variation in other factors. This is
Bell’s own story of the frequency of heart attacks in distant French cities. On
the other hand the papers contained a highly complex mathematical model
which was supposed to represent a local realistic reproduction of the singlet
correlations. Unfortunately the authors chose only to verify some necessary
conditions for the locality of their model. Hidden variables which in the
model were supposed to “belong” to one measurement station or the other
were shown to be statistically independent of one another.
In the latest publication Hess and Philipp have given a more transparent
specification of their model, and in particular have recognised the important
role played by one variable which in their earlier work was either treated as a
mere index or even suppressed from the notation altogether. This variable is
supposed to represent some kind of micro-time variable which is resident in
both wings of the experiment. It turns out to have a probability distribution
which depends on the measurement settings in both wings of the experiment.
The authors implicitly recognise that it is non-local but christen it a “non-
element-of-reality”. Thus non-local hidden variables are fine, we just should
not think of them as being real. They wisely point out that it seems to be a
very difficult problem to decide which variables are elements or reality and
which are not. In Appendix 2, I give a simplified version of their model.
’t Hooft and predetermination
’t Hooft notes that at the Planck scale experimenters will not have much free-
dom to choose settings on a measurement apparatus. Thus Bell’s position 2
gives license to search for a classical, local, deterministic theory behind the
quantum mechanical theory of the world at that level. So far so good.
However, presumably the quantum mechanical theory of the world at
the Planck scale is the foundation from which one can derive the quantum
mechanical theory of the world at levels closer to our everyday experience.
Thus, his classical, local and deterministic theory for physics at the Planck
scale is a classical, local and deterministic theory for physics at the level of
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present day laboratory experiments testing Bell’s theorem. It seems to me
that there are now two positions to take. The first one is that there is, also
at our level, no free choice. The experimenter thinks he is freely choosing
setting label number 2 in Alice’s wing of the experimenter, but actually the
photons arriving simultaneously in the other wing of the experiment, or the
stuff of the measurement apparatus there, “know” this in advance and capi-
talize on it in a very clever way: they produce deviations from the Bell in-
equality, though not larger than Cirel’sons quantum bound of 2
√
2 (they are,
after all, bound by quantum mechanics). But we have no way of seeing that
our “random” coin tosses are not random at all, but are powerfully correlated
with forever hidden variables in measurement apparatus far away. I find it
inconceivable that there is such powerful coordination between such totally
different physical systems (the brain of the experimenter, the electrons in the
photodetector, the choice of a particular number as seed of a pseudo-random
number generator in a particular computer program) that Bell’s inequality
can be resoundingly violated in the quantum optics laboratory, but nature as
a whole appears “local”, and randomizers appear random.
Now “free choice” is a notion belonging to philosophy and I would
prefer not to argue about physics by invoking a physicist’s apparently free
choice. It is a fact that one can create in a laboratory something which looks
very like randomness. One can run totally automated Bell-type experiments
in which measurement settings are determined by results of a chain of sep-
arate physical systems (quantum optics, mechanical coin tossing, computer
pseudo-random number generators). The point is that if we could carry out
a perfect and succesful Bell-type experiment, then if local realism is true an
exquisite coordination persists throughout this complex of physical systems
delivering precisely the right measurement settings at the two locations to
violate Bell’s inequalities, while hidden from us in all other ways.
There is another position, position 5: the perfect Bell-type experiment
cannot be made. Precisely because there is a local realistic hidden layer
to the deepest layer of quantum mechanics, when we separate quantum-
entangled physical systems far enough from one another in order to do sep-
arate and randomly chosen measurements on each, the entanglement will
have decayed so far that the observed correlations have a classical explana-
tion. Loopholes are unavoidable and the singlet state is an illusion.
Khrennikov and exotic probability theories
In a number of publications Khrennikov constrasts a classical probability
view which he associates with Kolmogorov, with a so-called contextualist
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viewpoint. He also contrasts the Kolmogorov point of view and the von
Mises (frequentist). Furthermore, he has suggested that the resolution of
Bell’s paradox might be found in some non-standard probability theory, for
instance p-adic. A rationale for this might be that stabilization of relative
frequencies might not be a fact at the micro-level, hence no classical proba-
bility theory can be applied there.
Let me first make some remarks on the question of whether an exotic
probability theory might explain away the Bell paradox. Though there is no
direct relation, I am reminded of an earlier attempt by Pitowsky (1989) to
resolve all paradoxes through adopting a mathematically very sophisticated
and non-standard version of probability theory, in that case, by allowing
non-measurable random variables and events. If events are not measurable,
and moreover have lower and upper probabilities equal to zero and one re-
spectively, then relative frequencies do not converge, but can have all values
between 0 and 1 as points of accumulation. This allows Pitowsky (1989) to
wriggle out of the constraint of Bell’s inequality. Each probability concern-
ing hidden variables can take any value.
Now experimentalists know that relative frequencies of macroscopic out-
comes do tend to converge under many repetitions of a carefully controlled
experiment, whether in quantum mechanics or not. The proof of Bell’s the-
orem as I give it does not require stabilization of relative frequencies of
some further unspecified micro-variables, but of joint relative frequencies
of macroscopic variables, both “what was actually measured” and of “what
might have been measured”. Moreover it assumes that the stabilized val-
ues respect, by showing statistical independence, the physical independence
which follows from locality. The results of a coin toss on one side of Inns-
bruck campus is not correlated with a photon measurement on the other side.
In the case of Pitowsky (1989), exotic probability does not “explain” at all;
what is called an explanation is sleight-of-hand hidden under impressive
(but very specialistic) mathematics. At best, the explanation would imply a
physics which is even more weird than quantum mechanics.
I have yet to study the case for p-adic probability carefully, but a priori I
am highly sceptical.
Regarding Kolmogorov and von Mises I have already remarked that I do
not see any opposition between alternative views of probability here. Ko-
mogorov merely describes probability, von Mises tries to explain it. Ko-
mogorov’s theory is mere accountancy. The underlying variable ω of a Ko-
mogorovian probability space is not a physical cause, a hidden variable, it
is merely a label of a possible outcome. Naturally, in classical physical sys-
tems, there is a many-to-one correspondence between initial conditions and
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distinguishable final conditions, so one could think of ω as being an element
of a big list of initial configurations. But this is not obligatory and, outside of
physics, it is not usual. See Kolmogorov (1933) for very clear descriptions
of what ω is supposed to stand for and how probability can be interpreted. I
think you will find that Kolmogorov was definitely a contextualist.
Kracklauer and the bombs under Bell’s theory
According to Kracklauer, one counter-example is enough to explode a the-
orem. Not content with one bomb he has come up with local realistic ex-
planations of a large number of celebrated experiments in quantum mechan-
ics. Unfortunately, showing that a long list of historical experiments did not
prove what various experimenters and interpreters claim, does not prove a
certain theory, which inspired those experiments, wrong.
On the theoretical side he also has a large number of arguments, but in
my opinion none is persuasive. One is that in real experiments there are not
binary outcomes but there is macroscopic photoelectric current. But one can
convert a continuous current to a binary outcome (does it exceed a given
threshold or not). Bell’s argument just requires that binary outcomes are
output and analysed; any intermediate steps are irrelevant.
Another argument is that photons do not actually exist. This certainly
is a serious point regarding Bell-type experiments in quantum optics, and is
connected to the Fifth Position, to which I will return. As a mathematician
I have to admit that the word “photon” is perhaps no more than just a word.
What we call a photon is associated with certain mathematical objects in
certain theories of “electro-magnetic radiation” and associated with point-
like events which one can identify in various experiments involving “light”.
Mathematics itself is just a game of logical manipulations of distinct sym-
bols on pieces of paper. Bell was careful to describe his decisive experiment
in terms of macroscopic every-day laboratory objects, and avoided any use
of words like “particle” which only have a meaning within an existing the-
ory.
Another argument is that the mathematics of spin does not involve Planck’s
constant hence does not involve quantum mechanics. The transfer of EPR
to the realm of spin half or of photons is lethal. However, it seems to me
that quantum mechanics is as much about incompatible observables as about
Planck’s constant.
Finally, Kracklauer enlists the support of the Jaynes (1989), who claimed
to have resolved all probability paradoxes in physics by proper use of proba-
bility theory. According to E.T. Jaynes, Bell’s factorization was an improper
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use of the chain rule for conditional probability. Apparently Jaynes did not
recognise an uncontroversial use of the notion of conditional independence.
Suppose I have a large collection of pairs of dice. The two dice in each pair
are identical. However half the pairs have two 1’s, two 2’s and two 3’s on
their faces, the half have two 4’s, two 5’s and two 6’s. Call these Type 1
and Type 2 dice. Naturally if many times in succession, we take a random
pair of dice, send one to Amsterdam and the other to Bagdad, and toss each
dice once, there will be a strong correlation between the outcomes in the two
locations. Denote by X and Y the outcomes at the two locations, and by T
the type of the dice. Suppose moreover that the dice-throwing apparatus in
Amsterdam and Bagdad each depend on a setting, called a and b, which is
chosen by a technician in each laboratory. (The result of the setting is to bias
the outcome in a way which I will not further specify here.) Bell calculates
as follows:
Eab{XY } = E{ Eab{XY | T} }
= Pr{T = 1}Eab{XY | T = 1} + Pr{T = 2}Eab{XY | T = 2}
= Pr{T = 1}Ea{X | T = 1}Eb{Y | T = 1}
+ Pr{T = 2}Ea{X | T = 2}Eb{Y | T = 2}.
Jaynes prefers to consider probabilities than expectations, that is fine. He
points out that the mere fact that our probability of seeing a particular value
for X is immediately changed when we are told the outcome of Y , does not
mean any spooky action at a distance (as Bell also many times explained).
He is also willing to apply the definition of conditional probability to write
Prab{X = x, Y = y | T = t}
= Prab{X = x | Y = y, T = t} Prab{Y = y | T = t}
but then refuses to admit
Prab{X = x | Y = y, T = t} = Pra{X = x | T = t},
Prab{Y = y | T = t} = Prb{Y = y | T = t},
going on to say that Bell’s theorem only prohibits Bell’s kind of local hidden
variable models, not all. He does not make any attempt to specify what he
understands by a local model, and expresses great surprise at very new re-
sults of Steve Gull, presented at the same conference as Jaynes’ own paper,
in which a computer network metaphor is introduced and where it is shown
that the singlet correlations cannot be simulated on such a network! (Steve
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Gull faxed me his two pages of notes on this, which he likes to use an ex-
amination exercise. His proof uses Fourier analysis). Jaynes thought that it
would take another 30 years to understand Gull’s work, just as it had taken
the world 20 years to understand Bell’s (the decisive understanding having
just come from E.T.). I am not impressed.
Bell’s use of probability language was in 1964 still a bit clumsy. Jaynes’
work led him to a strong sense that any probability paradox in physics is
most likely the result of muddled thinking. I suspect that Jaynes was so
confident of this general rule that he made no attempt to understand Bell’s
argument and consequently completely missed the point.
Volovich and the fifth position
Volovich’s recent work shows that in an EPR type context of the state of two
entangled particles propagating in three-dimensional space, quantum me-
chanics itself would prohibit a loophole free test of local realism. Basically,
particles will be lost with a too large probability, and the detection loophole
is present.
In my opinion it would be interesting to find out if this is generic. How-
ever one must bear in mind that Bell’s theorem is not dependent on a partic-
ular kind of physical scenario (for instance, polarization of entangled pho-
tons). The mathematical analysis must be carried out at a much more funda-
mental level in order to show that no physical system consisting of two well
separated subsystems can evolve into a sufficiently entangled state by any
means whatsover.
I would rather expect progress here to come from ’t Hooft’s programme:
show that quantum mechanics at the Planck scale has a local realistic ex-
planation, show that quantum mechanics at our scale is a consequence, and
hence that it too is constrained by local realism.
Alternatively progress will come from experiment: someone does carry
out a loophole free Bell-CHSH type experiment, or does factor large integers
in no time at all using a quantum computer.
6. Last Word
Tossing a coin, shuffling a pack or cards, picking a ball from an urn, are
classical paradigms of randomness. Moreover all these experiments are well
understood both from a physical and from a mathematical point of view. We
understand perfectly well how small variations in initial conditions are mag-
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nified exponentially and result in quite unpredictable macroscopic results.
On the basis of physical symmetries we can propose uniform probability
distributions over initial conditions, when listed appropriately, and can use
this to predict the probabilities of macroscopic outcomes, for instance of bi-
ased roulette wheels. We understand moreover that the probabilities of the
macroscopic outcomes are remarkably robust to the probability distribution
of initial conditions. Finally, the probability conclusions are quite indepen-
dent of the flavour of probability interpretation.
Actually, generating a pseudo-random number on a computer is no dif-
ferent, except that the fine control which we can impose on initial conditions
and on each intermediate step means that the result is exactly reproducible.
But one can also buy a coin-tossing apparatus which so precisely fixes the
initial velocity and angular momentum (among other factors) of the coin
being tossed, that (unless one is unfortunate and chooses initial conditions
close to the boundary between “heads” and “tails” that the coin falls the
same way, (almost) every time.
That statistical independence holds when well separated physical sys-
tems are each used to generate randomness, is not harder to understand. An
extraordinarily exquisite coordination between the number of times a pack
of cards is shuffled, and between the force used to spin a coin into the air,
could produce any degree of correlation in their outcomes.
These considerations mean that for me, that Bell’s theorem has more
or less nothing to do with interpretations of probability. Classical physi-
cal randomness, and classical physical independence, are what are at stake.
My conclusion (excluding the fifth position) is that quantum mechanics is
definitely non-classical.
In order to establish that quantum mechanics is non classical, we had to
assume that physical independence between randomization devices at sep-
arate locations in space is possible. We had to assume a degree of control
on the amount of information passing from one physical system to another:
when we press the button labelled “1” on one of the measurement devices,
only the fact that it was that button and not the other is important for the
subsequent physics, even though actually we exert more or less pressure,
for a longer or shorter time, and thereby could unbeknown to us be intro-
ducing information from other locations and from the distant past into the
apparatus. Bell’s conditional independence assumption is a way to express
the physical intuition, that even though this might introduce more statistical
variation into the outcome, it cannot carry information from the other wing
of the experiment, concerning the randomization outcome there.
I find it fascinating that in order to prove that quantum mechanics is
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intrinsically probabilistic (the outcomes cannot be traced back to variation
in initial conditions) we must assume that we can ourselves generate ran-
domness. And in order to demonstrate the kind of non-separatbility implied
by entanglement, we have to assume control and separation of the physical
systems which we use in our experiments.
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Appendix 1: Weihs’ data
b = 1 b = 1 b = 2 b = 2
y = +1 y = −1 y = +1 y = −1
a = 1 x = +1 313 1728 1636 179
a = 1 x = −1 1978 351 294 1143
a = 2 x = +1 418 1683 269 1100
a = 2 x = −1 1578 361 1386 156
The table show the numbers of occurrences of each of the 16 possible values
of (a, b, x, y), see Weihs’ 1999 thesis, page 113, available from his personal
web pages at www.quantum.at. The grand total is N = 14573.
Appendix 2: A local model of the singlet cor-
relations
I present a caricature of the Hess-Philipp model, quant-ph/0212085.
The caricature has all those properties, on the basis of which Hess and
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Philipp claimed its locality. However, the caricature is blatantly non local.
This makes it clear that Hess and Philipp are only checking necessary con-
ditions, not sufficient conditions, for locality. In my construction I will only
consider planar settings (orientiations), and measure angles as fractions of
2pi, thus settings a, b become points in the unit interval [0, 1] with endpoints
identified. I am going to construct random variables R, Λ∗, Λ∗∗, Λ whose
joint probability distribution is allowed by Hess and Philipp to depend on a
and b. Actually, my R will be a 2-vector. R is supposed to be some kind of
microscopic (i.e., hidden to the experimenter) time variable. Λ∗ and Λ∗∗ are
station variables. Λ is a source variable, transmitted to both stations.
Let a and b be given. Let Λ∗, Λ∗∗, and Λ be independent random vari-
ables, each uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Define R = (R1, R2) as follows:
R1 = (Λ
∗∗ + a) mod 1, (1)
R2 = (Λ
∗ + b) mod 1, (2)
As required by HP, conditional on R, the pair (Λ∗,Λ∗∗) is independent of
Λ. All further independence properties desired by HP are trivially satisfied.
However,
b = (R2 − Λ∗) mod 1, (3)
a = (R1 − Λ∗∗) mod 1. (4)
Consequently, given R and Λ∗ one can reconstruct b; given R and Λ∗∗ one
can reconstruct a and Λ∗.
Finally, let A = A(Λ∗,Λ, R, a) and B = B(Λ∗,Λ, R, b) be functions
taking values in {−1,+1}. From the given arguments to A and B, the miss-
ing station setting b and a can be reconstructed. From a, b and Λ one can
construct a pair of binary random variables with joint probability distribu-
tion depending in any way one likes on a and b. In particular one can arrange
to reproduce the singlet correlations.
To prove that both the HP model and this caricature are non-local, it
suffices to observe that they reproduce the singlet correlations in a realistic
fashion, and therefore by Bell’s theorem cannot be local-realistic. However,
according to Hess and Philipp this conclusion is short-sighted. Obviously,
R is not an element of reality! The only elements of reality in my model are
Λ, Λ∗ and Λ∗∗. They are evidently local, so my model is local, after all.
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